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Résumé: Nous étudions les propriétés de la réduction duale : une technique de 
réduction des jeux 
finis qui permet d'opérer une sélection entre les équilibres corrélés. Nous 
montrons que le processus de réduction est indépendant des fonctions d'utilités 
choisies pour représenter les préférences des agents et que les jeux à deux 
joueurs ont génériquement une unique réduction duale pleine. De plus, dans 
une réduction duale pleine, toutes les stratégies et tous les profils de stratégie 
qui ne sont jamais jouées dans des équilibres corrélés sont éliminées. Nous 
étudions les propriétés supplémentaires qu'a la réduction duale dans plusieurs 
classes de jeux et nous comparons la réduction duale à d'autres concepts de 
raffinement des équilibre corrélés. Enfin, nous passons en revue et relions les 
différentes preuves d'existence des équilibres corrélés fondées sur la 
programmation linéaire. 
 
Abstract: We study dual reduction: a technique to reduce finite games in a way that 
selects among correlated equilibria. We show that the reduction process is 
independent of the utility functions chosen to represent the agents's 
preferences and that generic two-player games have a unique full dual 
reduction. Moreover, in full dual reductions, all strategies and strategy profiles 
which are never played in correlated equilibria are eliminated. The additional 
properties of dual reduction in several classes of games are studied and dual 
reduction is compared to other correlated equilibrium refinement's concepts. 
Finally, we review and connect the linear programming proofs of existence of 
correlated equilibria. 
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1 Introduction
Dual reduction is a technique to reduce finite games in strategic form into games with
fewer strategies. It was introduced by Myerson [9]. Its main property is to select among
correlated equilibrium distributions1. That is, any correlated equilibrium distribution
of the reduced game induces a correlated equilibrium distribution in the original game.
Dual reduction thus provides a candidate refinement concept for correlated equilibrium
distributions: retaining only those correlated equilibrium distributions which are not
eliminated by dual reduction, or, in a more stringent way, by iterative dual reduction.
Myerson also showed that dual reduction includes elimination of weakly dominated
strategies as a special case and that, by iterative dual reduction, any game is eventually
reduced to an elementary game. That is, a game in which every player may be given,
in some correlated equilibrium, a strict incentive to play any of his pure strategies.
Little else is known on the properties of dual reduction. Yet, to evaluate dual re-
duction as a refinement concept, basic information is needed: which strategies and
equilibria are eliminated ? In which classes of games is the reduction process unique
? How does dual reduction behave in some important classes of games (e.g. zero-sum
games, symmetric games) ? In which precise sense does dual reduction ”generalize”
[9, p.202] elimination of dominated strategies ? What are the links between dual re-
duction and other correlated equilibrium refinement concepts ? These are some of the
questions that this paper tries to address.
Moreover, dual reduction is based on a concept called jeopardization [9] which is
very geometrical in nature (the fact that a strategy ”jeopardizes” some other strategy
means that the correlated equilibrium polytope is included in some hyperplane). It is
thus reasonable to hope that the dual reduction technique may be useful for investigat-
ing geometrical properties of correlated equilibria; in the last section and in [14] we
present evidence that this is indeed the case. But to use dual reduction as a tool, just as
to evaluate its relevance as a refinement concept, we first need to know more about its
properties.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follow: the main notations and defi-
nitions are introduced in the next section; we then recall, in section 3, the key-points
of the direct proofs of existence of correlated equilibrium distributions, on which dual
reduction is based. The existing results on dual reduction are reviewed in section 4. In
sections 5 and 6, the core of the paper, new results are established. They are summed up
at the beginning of section 5. In section 7, we compare dual reduction to another corre-
lated equilibrium refinement introduced by Myerson [7]: elimination of unacceptable
pure strategies. Examples of geometrical results proven via dual reduction are given in
the last section. In appendix A, we review and connect the direct proofs of existence
of correlated equilibria given in [3], [11] and [9]. Finally, for clarity sake, some of the
proofs are gathered in appendix B
1The correlated equilibrium concept, introduced by R. Aumann [1], is a generalization of the Nash equi-
librium concept to situations where players may condition their behavior in the game on payoff-irrelevant
signals received before play. A formal definition of correlated equilibrium distributions will be given in the
next section.
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2 Notations and definitions
2.1 Basic notations
The analysis in this paper is restricted to finite games in strategic form. The notations
are taken from [9]. Let Γ = {N, (Ci)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N} denote a finite game in strate-
gic form: N is the nonempty finite set of players, Ci the nonempty finite set of pure
strategies of player i and Ui : ×i∈NCi → R the utility function of player i. The set
of (pure) strategy profiles is C = ×i∈NCi; the set of strategy profiles for the players
other than i is C−i = ×j∈N−iCj . Pure strategies of player i (resp. strategy profiles;
strategy profiles of the players other than i) are denoted ci or di (c; c−i). We may write
(c−i, di) to denote the strategy profile that differs from c only in that its i−component
is di. For any finite set S, ∆(S) denotes the set of probability distributions over S.
Thus ∆(Ci) is the set of mixed strategies of player i, which we denote byσi or τi.
2.2 Correlated equilibrium distributions and deviation vectors
A correlated strategy of the players in N is an element of ∆(C). Thus µ = (µ(c))c∈C
is a correlated strategy if:
µ(c) ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C (1)∑
c∈C
µ(c) = 1 (2)
A correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium distribution [1] (abbreviated occasion-
ally in c.e.d.) if it satisfies the following incentive constraints:∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c)[Ui(c)− Ui(c−i, di)] ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀ci ∈ Ci, ∀di ∈ Ci (3)
The following interpretation and vocabulary will be useful for the next sections. Let
µ ∈ ∆(C) and consider the following extended game Γµ, based on Γ: before Γ is
played, a strategy profile c ∈ C is drawn at random with probability µ(c) by some
mediator; then the mediator privately recommends ci to player i; finally, Γ is played.2
The players can thus condition their strategy in Γ on their private signal. A strategy
of player i in this extended game is a mapping αi : Ci → ∆(Ci), which we call a
deviation plan. Denoting by αi(di|ci) the probability that player i will play di when
announced ci we have:
αi(di|ci) ≥ 0 ∀ci ∈ Ci, ∀di ∈ Ci,∀i ∈ N (4)∑
di∈Ci
αi(di|ci) = 1 ∀ci ∈ Ci,∀i ∈ N (5)
2Whether the players are aware of the game they are playing is unessential to the definition of correlated
equilibrium distributions. For clarity sake however, it may be assumed that the description of the game Γµ,
and in particular µ itself, is common knowledge among the players.
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A strategy profile is a deviation vector, i.e. a vector α = (αi)i∈N of deviation plans.
Such a deviation vector is trivial if, for all i in N , αi is the identity mapping. The
incentive constraints (3) mean that µ is a correlated equilibrium distribution of Γ if and
only if the trivial deviation vector is a Nash equilibrium of Γµ.
3 Existence of correlated equilibrium distributions
This section is a variation on the elementary proofs of existence of correlated equilibria
given in [3], [11] and [9]. Consider the following two-player, zero-sum auxiliary game
G: the maximizer chooses a correlated strategy µ in ∆(C); the minimizer chooses a
deviation vector α. The payoff is:
g(µ, α) =
∑
c∈C
µ(c)
∑
i∈N
∑
di∈Ci
αi(di|ci)[Ui(c)− Ui(c−i, di)] (6)
It is clear from section 2.2 that µ guarantees 0 if and only if µ is a correlated
equilibrium distribution of Γ. Thus Γ has a correlated equilibrium distribution if and
only if the value of G is nonnegative. The remaining of this section is devoted to an
elementary proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 The value of G is zero. Therefore correlated equilibrium distributions
exists.
A deviation plan αi : Ci → ∆(Ci) induces a Markov chain on Ci. This Markov
chain maps the distribution σi ∈ ∆(Ci) to the distribution αi ∗ σi given by:
αi ∗ σi(di) =
∑
ci∈I
αi(di|ci)σi(ci)∀di ∈ Ci
Similarly, if a mediator tries to implement µ but3 player i deviates unilaterally accord-
ing to αi, this generates a new distribution on strategy profiles αi ∗ µ:
αi ∗ µ(c−i, di) =
∑
ci∈Ci
αi(di|ci)µi(c) ∀di ∈ Ci,∀c−i ∈ C−i
Definition 3.2 Let α = (αi)i∈N be a deviation vector. A mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Ci)
is αi-invariant if αi ∗ σi = σi. A correlated strategy µ ∈ ∆(C) is αi-invariant (resp.
α-invariant) if (resp. if for all i ∈ N ) αi ∗ µ = µ.
Note that, by the basic theory of Markov chains, there exists at least one αi-invariant
strategy.
Let Ui(µ) =
∑
c∈C µ(c)Ui(c) denote the average payoff of player i if µ is imple-
mented. Myerson [9] shows that:
g(µ, α) =
∑
i∈N
[Ui(µ)− Ui(αi ∗ µ)] (7)
3That is, if the mediator draws a strategy profile c in C with probability µ(c) and then privately recom-
mends ci to player i.
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We can now prove theorem 3.1: first note that the minimizer can guarantee 0 by choos-
ing the trivial deviation vector. Thus we only need to show that the maximizer can
defend 0. Let α denote a deviation vector; for each i, let σi ∈ ∆(Ci) be αi-invariant.
The correlated strategy σ =
∏
i∈N σi is α-invariant; hence, by (7), g(σ, α) = 0. There-
fore the maximizer can defend 0.
4 Dual reduction
All results of this section are proved in [9].
4.1 Definition
The Markov chain on Ci induced by αi partitions Ci into transient states and disjoint
minimal absorbing sets4. For any minimal absorbing set Bi, there exists a unique αi-
invariant strategy with support in Bi5. Let Ci/αi denote the set of (randomized) αi-
invariant strategies with support in some minimal αi-absorbing set. It may be shown
that the set of αi-invariant strategies is the set of random mixture of the strategies in
Ci/αi; that is, the simplex ∆(Ci/αi).
Let α = (αi)i∈N be a deviation vector. The α-reduced game
Γ/α = {N, (Ci/αi)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N}
is the game obtained from Γ by restricting the players to α-invariant strategies. That
is, the set of players and the payoff functions are the same than in Γ but, for all i in N ,
the pure strategy set of player i is now Ci/αi.6
Before turning to dual reduction and their properties, let us make our vocabulary
precise: let ci, di ∈ Ci (resp. c ∈ C). The pure strategy ci (resp. strategy profile c)
is eliminated in the α-reduced game Γ/α if σi(ci) = 0 for all σi in Ci/αi (resp. if
σ(c) = 0 for all σ in C/α). Thus ci (resp. c) is eliminated if and only if (resp. if and
only if for some i in N ) ci is transient under αi. The strategies ci and di are grouped
together if there exists σi in Ci/αi such that σi(ci) and σi(di) are positive. Thus, ci
and di are grouped together if and only if they are recurrent under αi and belong to the
same minimal αi-absorbing set.
Definition 4.1 A dual vector is an optimal strategy of the minimizer in the auxiliary
game of section 3. Thus a deviation vector α is a dual vector if for all c in C:
−g(c, α) =
∑
i∈N
[Ui(αi ∗ c)− Ui(c)] =
∑
i∈N
∑
di∈Ci
αi(di|ci)[Ui(c−i, di)− Ui(c)] ≥ 0
(8)
(The above equalities merely repeat the definition of g(c, α).)
4A subset Bi of Ci is αi-absorbing if α(di|ci) = 0 for all ci in Bi and all di in Ci − Bi. An
αi-absorbing set is minimal if it contains no proper αi-absorbing subset.
5Actually its support is exactly Bi.
6Strictly speaking the payoff functions of the reduced game are the functions induced by the original
payoff functions on the reduced strategy space.
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Definition 4.2 A dual reduction of Γ is an α-reduced game Γ/α where α is a dual vec-
tor. An iterative dual reduction of Γ is a reduced game Γ/α1/α2/.../αm, where m is a
positive integer and, for all k in {1, 2, ...,m}, αk is a dual vector of Γ/α1/α2/.../αk−1.
Many examples can be found in [9, section 6]. Henceforth, unless stated otherwise, α
is a dual vector.
4.2 Main properties
First, dual reduction generalizes elimination of weakly dominated strategies in the fol-
lowing sense:
Proposition 4.3 Let ci ∈ Ci; assume that there exists σi ∈ ∆(Ci), σi 6= ci, such that
Ui(c−i, σi) ≥ Ui(c) for all c−i in C−i. Then there exists a dual vector α such that
Ci/αi = Ci − {ci} and Cj/αj = Cj for j 6= i.
Proof. Take for α: αi(di|ci) = σi(di) for all di ∈ Ci, and αj(cj |cj) = 1 if j 6= i or
cj 6= ci
The main property of dual reduction is that it selects among correlated equilibrium
distributions: let Γ/α denote a dual reduction of Γ; let C/α = ×i∈NCi/αi denote the
set of strategy profiles of Γ/α. Let λ ∈ ∆(C/α); the Γ-equivalent correlated strategy
λ¯ is the distribution on C induced by λ:
λ¯(c) =
∑
σ∈C/α
λ(σ)
(∏
i∈N
σi(ci)
)
(9)
Theorem 4.4 If λ is a correlated equilibrium distribution of Γ/α, then λ¯ is a corre-
lated equilibrium distribution of Γ.
By induction, theorem 4.4 extends to iterative dual reductions. That is, any correlated
equilibrium distribution of an iterative dual reduction of Γ induces on ∆(C) a corre-
lated equilibrium distribution of Γ. A side product of the proof of theorem 4.4 is that,
against any strategy of the other players in the reduced game, player i is indifferent
between his strategies within a minimal absorbing set:
Proposition 4.5 Let Bi denote a minimal αi-absorbing set. For j 6= i, let σj ∈ Cj/αj
and let σ−i = ×j∈N−iσj . For any ci, di in Bi, Ui(σ−i, ci) = Ui(σ−i, di).
4.3 Jeopardization and Elementary Games
Let us say that a dual vector is trivial if it is the trivial deviation vector. A game may
be reduced if and only if there exists a nontrivial dual vector7. So we are led to the
question: when do nontrivial dual vectors exist ? A first step to answer this question is
to introduce the notions of jeopardization and elementary games:
7This is clear from the basic theory of Markov chains. See for instance [4] and references therein.
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Definition 4.6 Let ci, di ∈ Ci. The strategy di jeopardizes ci if for all correlated
equilibrium distributions µ:∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c)[Ui(c)− Ui(c−i, di)] = 0
That is, in all correlated equilibrium distributions in which ci is played, di is an al-
ternative best response to the conditional probabilities on C−i given ci. Note that if
ci has zero probability in all correlated equilibrium distributions, then any di in Ci
jeopardizes ci. Using complementary slackness properties allows to prove that:
Proposition 4.7 The strategy di jeopardizes ci if and only if there exists a dual vector
α such that αi(di|ci) > 0.
Thus, there exists a nontrivial dual vector if and only if some strategy is jeopardized by
some other strategy.
Definition 4.8 A correlated equilibrium distribution µ is strict if
µ(ci×C−i) > 0⇒
∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c)[Ui(c)−Ui(c−i, di)] > 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀ci ∈ Ci,∀di 6= ci
A game is elementary if it has a strict correlated equilibrium distribution with full
support. Myerson [9] shows that a game is elementary if and only if there exists no
i, ci and di 6= ci such that di jeopardizes ci. Thus proposition 4.7 implies:
Corollary 4.9 A game may be reduced if and only if it is not elementary. By iterative
dual reduction, any game is eventually reduced to an elementary game.
4.4 Full dual reduction
Let us say that two dual reductions Γ/α and Γ/β of the same game are different if
C/α 6= C/β. A game may admit different dual reductions (for instance, if several
strategies are weakly dominated). A tentative way to restore uniqueness is to consider
only reductions by some special dual vectors, which minimize the number of pure
strategies remaining in the reduced game:
Definition 4.10 A dual vector α is full if α(di|ci) > 0 for all i in N , and all ci, di in
Ci such that di jeopardizes ci.
Full dual vectors always exist [9]. Actually, almost all dual vectors are full8.
Definition 4.11 A full dual reduction of Γ is an α-reduced game Γ/α where α is a full
dual vector. An iterative full dual reduction of depth m of Γ is a game Γ/α1/α2/.../αm
where m is a positive integer and, for all k in {1, 2, ...,m}, αk is a full dual vector of
Γ/α1/α2/.../αk−1.
8The set of dual vectors is a polytope, whose relative interior is non empty if G is not elementary. All dual
vectors in the relative interior of this polytope are full. If G is elementary, the only dual vector is trivially
full.
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All full dual vectors α define, for all i, the same minimal αi-absorbing sets. Thus
in all full dual reductions, the same strategies are eliminated and the same strategies
are grouped together. A game may nonetheless admit different full dual reductions,
because the way these strategies are grouped together may differ quantitatively. We
will return to this point in section 6.
5 Other properties of dual reduction
A basic desirable property for a decision-theoretic concept is that it be independent of
the specific utility functions chosen to represent the preferences of the agents. So we
begin by showing that dual reduction meets this requirement; that is, the ways in which
a game may be reduced are unaffected by positive affine transformations of the utility
functions. We then extends theorem 4.4 to other equilibrium concepts, including Nash
one’s, and prove its converse: if a correlated strategy λ of a reduced game induces an
equilibrium distribution in the original game, then λ is an equilibrium distribution of
the reduced game. We then investigate eliminations of strategies and equilibria. We
show that strategies that are weakly dominated (resp. are never played in correlated
equilibria; have positive probability in some strict correlated equilibrium) need not be
(resp. are always; cannot be) eliminated in full dual reductions. Finally we study some
specific classes of games. We show that games that are best-response equivalent to
zero-sum games, as well as games with a unique correlated equilibrium distribution
are reduced in games with a single strategy profile by full dual reduction. Symmetric
games are shown to have symmetric full dual reductions (but possibly also asymmetric
ones) and generic 2× 2 games are analysed.
In section 6, we show that, even if only full dual reductions are used, there might
still be multiple ways to reduce a game. This typically happens when some player is
indifferent between some of his strategies: a nongeneric event. We show that generic
two-players games have a unique sequence of iterative full dual reductions.
5.1 Independence from the choice of utility functions
Recall that two games with the same sets of players and strategies are best-response
equivalent [12] if they have the same best-response correspondences. Many central
concepts of game-theory are based on the best-response correspondences alone (say,
Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, to name but a few). Games
which are best-response equivalent have, in particular, the same sets of Nash and cor-
related equilibria. It is thus reassuring to note that such games are reduced similarly by
dual reduction:
Proposition 5.1 Let Γ and Γ′ be best-response equivalent. Let ci, di be pure strategies
of player i in Γ and c′i, d′i the corresponding strategies of player i in Γ′. The following
holds: (i) di jeopardizes ci if and only if d′i jeopardizes c′i; (ii) the strategies grouped
together (resp. eliminated) in full dual reductions of Γ correspond to the strategies
grouped together (resp. eliminated) in full dual reductions of Γ′.
Proof. (i) is clear from the definitions; (ii) follows immediately from (i)
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If Γ and Γ′ are not only best-response equivalent, but rescalings of each other (as
defined below), then there is actually a canonical, one to one correspondence between
dual reductions of Γ and dual reductions of Γ′:
Proposition 5.2 For each i in N , let φi : R → R denote a positive affine trans-
formation. That is, such that there exists real numbers ai > 0 and bi such that
φi(x) = aix + bi for all x in R. Let φ(Γ) denote the rescaling of Γ obtained by
changing the utility functions from Ui to φi ◦ Ui:
φ(Γ) = {N, (Ci)i∈N , (φi ◦ Ui)i∈N )
If Γ/α is a dual reduction of Γ, then φ(Γ/α) is a dual reduction of φ(Γ).
The proof of proposition 5.2 will be given below. This proposition is not trivial because
a game and its rescalings need not have the same dual vectors. Indeed, consider a game
such as Matching-Pennies, which is nonelementary and in which all pure strategies are
undominated in the following sense:
∀i ∈ N, ∀ci ∈ Ci,∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci), σi 6= ci ⇒ ∃c−i ∈ C−i, Ui(c) > Ui(c−i, σi)
Let α be a nontrivial dual vector: there exist i and ci such that αi ∗ ci 6= ci. In
proposition 4.3 we will see that since ci is not weakly dominated, there exists c−i such
that Ui(αi ∗ c) − Ui(c) < 0. Multiplying the payoff of player i by ai > 0 yields a
rescaled game Γ′ such that:∑
j∈N
[U ′j(αj ∗ c)− U
′
j(c)] = ai[Ui(αi ∗ c)− Ui(c)] +
∑
j 6=i
[Uj(αj ∗ c)− Uj(c)]
If ai is high enough, this expression is negative so that α cannot be a dual vector of Γ′.
The key is that different deviation vectors may induce the same dual reductions:
Lemma 5.3 Let αi (resp. αidi ) be a (resp. the trivial) deviation plan for player i. For
any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, let αǫ = ǫαi + (1− ǫ)αidi . If ǫ is positive then Ci/αi = Ci/αǫi .
Proof. For any mixed strategy σi in ∆(Ci), αǫi ∗ σi − σi = ǫ(αi ∗ σi − σi).
Proof of proposition 5.2: Let α be a dual vector of Γ. Let ak = mini∈N ai and, for
each i in N , let ǫi = ak/ai. Let φ(α) denote the deviation vector whose ith component
is αǫii , defined in lemma 5.3. Let g and gφ denote the payoff functions in the auxiliary
zero-sum games associated respectively to Γ and φ(Γ). We have:
gφ(c, φ(α)) = ak × g(c, α) ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C
Thus φ(α) is a dual vector of φ(Γ). Furthermore lemma 5.3 implies: φ(Γ)/φ(α) =
φ(Γ/α). Thus φ(Γ/α) is a dual reduction of φ(Γ). The result still holds if we allow the
constants bi to depend on c−i. Indeed, if the payoff functions (Uφi )i∈N in the rescaled
game φ(Γ) are of the slightly more general form: Uφi (c) = ai × Ui(c) + bi(c−i) with
ai > 0 and bi : C−i → R, then the same proof shows that for any dual vector α of Γ,
φ(Γ/α) is a dual reduction of φ(Γ).
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5.2 Extension and converse of theorem 4.4
In this section, we first present three equilibrium concepts introduced in or related to
[13]. We then show that theorem 4.4 extends to Nash equilibrium distributions9, and to
these other equilibrium concepts. We illustrate this by an example. Finally, we prove a
converse of theorem 4.4.
Let µ ∈ ∆(C) and ci ∈ Ci. If µ(ci × C−i) > 0, let µ(.|ci) denote the conditional
probability on C−i given ci:
µ(c−i|ci) = µ(c−i, ci)/µ(ci × C−i)
Definition 5.4 The correlated strategy µ ∈ ∆(C) is an equalizing distribution if
µ(ci × C−i) > 0⇒
∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c−i|ci)Ui(c) = Ui(µ) ∀i ∈ N, ∀ci ∈ Ci,
That is, in an equalizing distribution, the expected payoff given a pure strategy is inde-
pendent of this strategy.
Definition 5.5 The correlated strategy µ ∈ ∆(C) is an equalizing correlated equi-
librium distribution10 (henceforth equalizing c.e.d.) if µ is both an equalizing and a
correlated equilibrium distribution11.
Definition 5.6 The correlated strategy µ ∈ ∆(C) is a stable matching distribution12 if
every player i in N and all pure strategies ci and di of player i:
µi(ci × C−i)µi(di × C−i) > 0⇒
∑
c−i∈C−i
[µ(c−i|ci)− µ(c−i|di)]Ui(c) ≥ 0
That is, ci yields a (weakly) higher expected payoff against the correlated strategy
µ(.|ci) of the players other than i than against µ(.|di).
Proposition 5.7 Let λ be a correlated strategy of an iterative dual reduction Γr of Γ.
If λ is an equilibrium distribution of Γr then the Γ-equivalent correlated strategy is
an equilibrium distribution of Γ, where equilibrium distribution may stand for: Nash
equilibrium distribution, equalizing distribution, equalizing c.e.d. or stable matching
distribution.
Proof. Notations and preliminary remarks: let λ ∈ ∆(C/α) and let λ ∈ ∆(C) be
Γ-equivalent to λ. Let ci, di ∈ Ci check λ(ci × C−i)λ(di × C−i) > 0. There exist
minimal αi-absorbing sets Bi and B′i such that ci belongs to Bi and di to B′i. Let σci
(resp. σdi ) be the αi-invariant strategy with support in Bi (resp. B′i). Since λ(ci×C−i)
(resp. λ(di×C−i)) is positive, λ(σci ×(C/α)−i) (resp. λ(σdi ×(C/α)−i)) is positive
9The extension to Nash equilibrium distributions has been independently noted by Myerson.
10Sorin [13] uses the expression distribution equilibrium
11Any Nash equilibrium distribution is an equalizing c.e.d. but the converse is false. See example 5.8.
12Sorin [13] uses the expression dual correlated equilibrium
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too. Note that: (i) Ui(λ) = Ui(λ) and (ii) λ(.|ci) is the conditional probability induced
on C−i by λ(.|σci). That is, if cj is αj-recurrent for all j in N − i, then:
λ(c−i|ci) = λ(σc−i |σci)

 ∏
j∈N−i
σcj (cj)

 where σc−i = ×j∈N−iσcj
Otherwise, λ¯(c−i|ci) = 0. The proofs are now easy:
Nash equilibrium: it follows from (9) that if λ is an independent distribution, then so
is λ. This and theorem 4.4 imply that if λ is both an independent and a correlated
equilibrium distribution, i.e. a Nash equilibrium distribution, then so is λ.
Equalizing distributions and equalizing c.e.d.: Using (i) and (ii) we get:∑
σ−i∈(C/α)−i
λ(σ−i|σci)Ui(σ−i, σci) = Ui(λ)⇒
∑
c−i∈C−i
λ(c−i|ci)Ui(c) = Ui(λ)
Thus if λ is an equalizing distribution, then so is λ. This and theorem 4.4 imply that if
λ is an both an equalizing and a correlated equilibrium distribution, then so is λ.
Stable matching distributions: Using (ii) we get:∑
σ−i∈(C/α)−i
[λ(σ−i|σci)− λ(σ−i|σdi)]Ui(σ−i, σci) ≥ 0
=⇒
∑
c−i∈C−i
[λ(c−i|ci)− λ(c−i|di)]Ui(c) ≥ 0
Thus if λ is a stable matching distribution, then so is λ.
The following example illustrates proposition 5.7:
Example 5.8
x2 y2 z2
x1 2, 0 0, 2 0,−3
y1 0, 1 1, 0 0, 0
z1 −3, 0 0, 0 1, 1
σB2 z2
σB1 2/3, 2/3 0,−1
z1 −1, 0 1, 1
Let Γ denote the game on the left. Consider the deviation vector α such that for i =
1, 2 :
αi(xi|xi) = 2/3, αi(yi|xi) = 1/3; αi(xi|yi) = 1/6, αi(yi|yi) = 5/6; αi(zi|zi) = 1,
and all other αi(di|ci) are zero. We let the reader check that α is a dual vector. The
minimal αi-absorbing sets are Bi = {xi, yi} and B′i = {zi}. The α-reduced game
Γ/α is the game on the right, where the αi-invariant strategy σBi is ( 13 ;
2
3 ; 0). Con-
sider the distribution λ on C/α (below, right).13 This is an equalizing c.e.d. of Γ/α.
13We represent correlated strategies in tables. For instance, λ(σB1 , z2) = 1/8.
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Therefore, the Γ-equivalent distribution λ¯ (below, left) is an equalizing c.e.d. of Γ.
λ¯ =
1/24 1/12 1/24
1/12 1/6 1/12
1/24 1/12 3/8
λ =
3/8 1/8
1/8 3/8
Theorem 4.4 states that correlated equilibrium distributions of Γ/α induce correlated
equilibrium distributions in Γ. We may wonder whether a correlated strategy of Γ/α
which would not be not a correlated equilibrium distribution, might nonetheless induce
a correlated equilibrium distribution in Γ. We show below that the answer is negative.
We first need a lemma:
Lemma 5.9 Given any deviation vector α, a distribution λ¯ ∈ ∆(C) is α-invariant if
and only if it is Γ-equivalent to a distribution λ ∈ ∆(C/α). Such a λ is then unique.
Proof. See appendix B.
Proposition 5.10 Let α denote a dual vector. Let λ¯ denote an α-invariant distribu-
tion on C and λ the corresponding distribution on C/α. Then λ¯ is an equilibrium
distribution of Γ if and only if λ is an equilibrium distribution of Γ/α, where equilib-
rium distribution may stand for: Nash equilibrium distribution, correlated equilibrium
distribution, equalizing distribution, equalizing c.e.d. or stable matching distribution.
Proof. We prove proposition 5.10 for correlated equilibrium distributions. The other
proofs are similar. Let λ¯ ∈ ∆(C/α) and assume that λ is not a c.e.d.. Then there
exist i in N and σi, τi in Ci/αi such that σi has positive probability under λ but τi is a
strictly better response than σi to λ(.|σi). If ci ∈ Ci belong to the support of σi, player
i is indifferent between ci and σi against λ(.|σi) (proposition 4.5), hence τi is a strictly
better response than ci to λ(.|σi). Finally, λ¯(ci ×C−i) = λ(σi × (C/α)−i)σi(ci) > 0
and λ(.|ci) is Γ-equivalent to λ(.|σi). Therefore τi is a strictly better response than ci
to λ¯(.|ci) hence λ¯ is not a c.e.d.
5.3 Elimination of strategies and equilibria
In this section we study classes of strategies and equilibria which are always (or never)
eliminated in dual reductions (resp. full dual reductions; iterative full dual reductions).
A first result is a converse of proposition 4.3:
Proposition 5.11 Let ci ∈ Ci; assume that there exists a dual vector α such that
ci /∈ Ci/αi and Cj/αj = Cj for all j in N − i. Then there exists σi 6= ci in ∆(Ci)
such that Ui(c−i, σi) ≥ Ui(c) for all c−i in C−i.
Proof. Let σi = αi ∗ ci. For all j 6= i, all strategies cj in Cj are αj-invariant. Thus (8)
yields Ui(c−i, σi) ≥ Ui(c) ∀c−i ∈ C−i. Furthermore ci /∈ Ci/αi hence ci cannot be
αi-invariant and σi 6= ci
Thus, only if a strategy is dominated does there exists a dual reduction that simply
consists in eliminating this strategy. Note that if a strategy is weakly dominated it is
eliminated in some dual reductions (proposition 4.3), but not necessarily in full dual
reductions:
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Example 5.12
x2 y2
x1 1, 1 1, 0
y1 1, 0 0, 0
In the above game, µ is a correlated equilibrium distribution if and only if y2 is not
played in µ. That is, µ(x1, y2) = µ(y1, y2) = 0. Therefore y1 jeopardizes x1, and
reciprocally. Thus, in all full dual reductions, x1 and y1 must be grouped together
hence y1 is not eliminated.
This raises the following questions: except strictly dominated strategies, are there other
classes of strategies that are always eliminated in full dual reductions ? A partial answer
is the following:
Proposition 5.13 (i) Let c ∈ C. Assume that c has probability zero in all correlated
equilibrium distributions. In full dual reductions c is eliminated; hence there exists i in
N such that, in all full dual reductions, ci is eliminated. (ii) Let i ∈ N, ci ∈ Ci. Assume
that ci has marginal probability zero in all correlated equilibrium distributions. Then
ci is eliminated in all full dual reductions.
Proof. First note that (i) implies (ii). Indeed, let σi ∈ Ci/αi and σ−i ∈ (C/α)−i. If
µ(c) = 0 for all correlated equilibrium distributions µ and all c−i in C−i then, by (i),
σ(c) = σi(ci)σ−i(c−i) = 0 for all c−i ∈ C−i implying σi(ci) = 0. We now prove (i):
first recall that the same strategies and strategy profiles are eliminated in all full dual
reductions. So we only need to prove that the results hold for some full dual reduction.
Step 1: Assume that µ(c) = 0 for all c.e.d. µ of Γ. Then it follows from [11,
page 432 and Proposition 2] that there exists a dual vector α such that g(c, α) < 0.
Since g(d, α) ≤ 0 for all d in C, this implies that if c has positive probability in some
correlated strategy µ then g(µ, α) < 0.
Step 2: we may assume α full (otherwise, replace α by some strictly convex combi-
nation of α and some full dual vector). If σ belongs to C/α, then σ is α-invariant thus
g(σ, α) = 0 by (7). Hence c cannot have positive probability in σ. Since this holds
for all σ in C/α, c has been eliminated in the full dual reduction Γ/α. Finally, ci must
have been eliminated for some i, otherwise c would not have been eliminated.
Let Γ∗ denote the game obtained from Γ by deleting all pure strategies that have
marginal probability zero in all correlated equilibrium distributions. Proposition 5.13
suggests that Γ and Γ∗ have the same full dual reductions, but this is not so:
Example 5.14
x2 y2
x1 1, 1 0, 1
y1 0, 1 1, 0
x2 y2
x1 1, 1 0, 1
Let Γ denote the left game. Then Γ∗ is the game on the right. In Γ∗ any mixed strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium. In Γ, a mixed strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if σ1(y1) = 0 and σ2(y2) ≤ 1/2. In any full dual reduction of Γ or Γ∗
there is a single strategy profile. If σ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ (resp. Γ∗) then there
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exists a full dual vector α of Γ (resp. Γ∗) such that C/α = σ (resp. C∗/α = σ) if and
only if σ(y2) and σ(x2) are positive. Thus the set of full dual reductions of Γ is strictly
included in the set of full dual reductions of Γ∗.
We now shift our attention to elimination of equilibria. Since dual reduction includes
elimination of dominated strategies as a subprocess, it is clear that dual reduction may
eliminate Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria may also be eliminated as strategies are
grouped together (see for instance [9, fig. 7]). We show in section 7 that completely
mixed, hence perfect Nash equilibria may be eliminated in full dual reductions. In
contrast:
Proposition 5.15 Strict correlated equilibrium distributions cannot be eliminated, not
even in an iterative dual reduction.
Proof. If µ is a strict correlated equilibrium distribution, a strategy that has positive
marginal probability in µ cannot be jeopardized by another strategy. Thus, in any dual
reduction Γ/α of Γ all the strategies used in µ must be available. Furthermore, as the
player’s options are more limited in Γ/α than in Γ, µ is a fortiori a strict correlated
equilibrium distribution of Γ. Inductively, in any iterative dual reduction Γ/α1/.../αm
of Γ, all strategies used in µ are available and µ is still a strict correlated equilibrium
distribution
The proof shows that a pure strategy that has positive marginal probability in some
strict correlated equilibrium distribution can never be eliminated nor grouped with
other strategies.
5.4 Some classes of games
In this section we study the additional properties of dual reduction in several classes of
games.
5.4.1 Games with a unique correlated equilibrium distribution
If Γ has a unique Nash equilibrium σ, then any iterative dual reduction of Γ has a
unique Nash equilibrium, which induces σ in Γ; but the strategy space need not be
reducible to σ: counterexamples are [5, p.204] and [11, example 4]. In contrast,
Proposition 5.16 Assume that Γ has a unique correlated equilibrium distribution σ.
Then σ is a Nash equilibrium distribution, hence it may be seen as a mixed strategy
profile. Let Γr be the reduced game in which the only strategy profile is σ and the
payoff for player i is Ui(σ). Any full (resp. elementary iterative) dual reduction of Γ is
equal to Γr. In particular, Γ has a unique full dual reduction.
Proof. Consider first an elementary iterative dual reduction Γe of Γ. Since Γe is
elementary, Γe has a strict c.e.d. with full support σe. Since Γ has a unique c.e.d., Γe
has a unique c.e.d. too, thus σe is actually a Nash, hence a strict Nash equilibrium. So
σe is pure. But σe has full support. So σe is the only strategy profile. Finally, σe must
be Γ-equivalent to σ, hence Γe = Γr.
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Consider now a full dual reduction Γ/α of Γ. By proposition 5.13, the strategies
that are not played in σ are eliminated in Γ/α. For each i in N , the pure strategies of
player i in the support of σi jeopardize each other and thus must be grouped in a single
mixed strategy. Finally, the unique strategy profile of Γ/α must be equivalent to σ,
hence Γ/α = Γr.
5.4.2 Zero-sum games
We begin with a claim:
Claim 5.17 Any iterative dual reduction of a zero-sum game is a zero-sum game with
the same value.
Proof. Conservation of the zero-sum property is immediate. Conservation of the value
comes from theorem 4.4 and the fact that in a two-player zero-sum game, any correlated
equilibrium payoff equals the value of the game
Proposition 5.18 Let Γ denote a two-player zero-sum game and α a deviation vector.
(i) If for all i = 1, 2 and for all ci in Ci, αi ∗ ci is an optimal strategy of player i, then
α is a dual vector; (ii) If furthermore, αi ∗ ci is the same optimal strategy σi for all ci
in Ci, then Ci/αi = σi (iii) in any elementary iterative dual reduction of Γ there is a
unique strategy profile, which is a product of optimal strategies of Γ.
Proof. Proof of (i): let c ∈ C. By optimality of α1 ∗ c1, U1(α1 ∗ c1, c2) ≥ v, where v
is the value of the game. Similarly, U2(c1, α2 ∗ c2) ≥ −v. Since U1(c) + U2(c) = 0,∑
i=1,2[Ui(c−i, αi ∗ ci) − Ui(c)] ≥ 0. That is, g(c, α) ≥ 0. Since this holds for all c
in C, α is a dual vector.
Proof of (ii): assume that there exists σi in ∆(Ci) such that αi ∗ ci = σi for all ci
in Ci. Then the only αi-invariant strategy is σi. Therefore, Ci/αi = {σi}.
Proof of (iii): The above implies that any two-player zero-sum game whose set of
strategy profiles is not a singleton can be further reduced. Together with claim 5.17, this
implies that in any elementary iterative dual reduction of Γ, there is a unique strategy
profile. This strategy profile induces a Nash equilibrium in Γ. Therefore it must be
(equivalent to) a product of optimal strategies of Γ.
Proposition 5.19 If Γ is best-response equivalent to a two-player zero-sum game then:
(i) for any i in N , any (pure) strategy ci which has positive marginal probability under
some correlated equilibrium distribution jeopardizes all other strategies of player i;
(ii) in all full dual reductions of Γ all the strategies of player i that have positive
probability in some correlated equilibrium distribution are grouped together and his
other strategies are eliminated hence (iii) there is a unique strategy profile σ. (iv)
This strategy profile corresponds to a product of optimal strategies in the underlying
zero-sum game.
Proof. σ must be equivalent to a Nash equilibrium of Γ. This allows to prove (iv).
Point (iii) follows from (ii) and proposition 5.13; (ii) follows from (i); (i) is proved in
[14, proposition 6.1].
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If Γ is zero-sum with value v, then the payoffs in any full dual reduction of Γ must
be (v,−v). In contrast, if Γ is only best response equivalent to a zero sum game, then
the payoffs in a full dual reduction of Γ may depend on the full dual reduction:
Example 5.20
x2 y2 z2
x1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
y1 0, 0 1,−1 −1, 1
z1 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
x2 y2 z2
x1 1, 1 0, 1 0, 1
y1 1, 0 1,−1 −1, 1
z1 1, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
Let Γ (resp. Γ′) denote the game on the left (resp. right). Γ is zero-sum and Γ′ is best
response equivalent to Γ. The proof of proposition 5.2 shows that Γ and Γ′ have the
same dual vectors. For 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, let σǫi denote the optimal strategy of player i such
that: σǫi (xi) = ǫ and σǫi (yi) = σǫi (zi) = (1−ǫ)/2. Let αǫ,η denote the deviation vector
such that: α1 ∗x1 = α1 ∗y1 = α1 ∗z1 = σǫ1 and α2 ∗x2 = α2 ∗y2 = α2 ∗z2 = σ
η
2 . By
proposition 5.18, α is a dual vector of Γ, hence of Γ′. If 0 < ǫ < 1 and 0 < η < 1, α
is full, the reduced strategy space C ′/αǫ,η is the singleton (σǫ1, ση2 ) and the associated
payoff is (η, ǫ).
5.4.3 Symmetric Games
In appendix B we recall the definition of a symmetric game and prove the following:
Proposition 5.21 Let Γ be a symmetric game. There exists a full dual vector α such
that Γ/α is symmetric.
Example 5.8 shows that a nonsymmetric game may also have symmetric full dual re-
ductions, even if all strategies are undominated. The following example shows that a
symmetric game may have nonsymmetric full dual reductions:
Example 5.22
x2 y2
x1 1, 1 0, 1
y1 1, 0 0, 0
In the above symmetric game Γ, any deviation vector is a dual vector. In any full dual
reduction, the reduced strategy space is a singleton. For any 0 < ǫ < 1, 0 < η < 1,
there exists a full dual reduction in which the payoff is (ǫ, η). If ǫ 6= η, this full dual
reduction is nonsymmetric.
5.4.4 Generic 2× 2 games
Proposition 5.23 Let Γ be a 2×2 game such that a player is never indifferent between
two different strategy profiles. That is, for all c, c′ in C and all i = 1, 2: c 6= c′ ⇒
Ui(c) 6= Ui(c
′). Then either Γ is elementary or Γ has a unique correlated equilibrium
distribution (in which case proposition 5.16 apply).
Proof. Straightforward computations. The first case corresponds to games with three
Nash equilibria: two pure and one completely mixed; the second case to games with
either a dominating strategy or a unique, completely mixed Nash equilibrium.
15
6 The issue of uniqueness
As shown by example 5.22, a game may have several full dual reductions. This ambi-
guity arises naturally when a player is indifferent between some of his strategies:
Proposition 6.1 Assume that player i is indifferent between ci and di, i.e. Ui(c) =
Ui(c−i, di) for all c−i in C−i. Then (i) for any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 there exists a dual reduction
that simply consists in grouping ci and di in the strategy σi such that σi(ci) = ǫ and
σi(di) = 1 − ǫ; (ii) if ci is not eliminated in full dual reductions, then there exists an
infinity of full dual reductions.
Proof. To prove (i) take as dual vector α: αi(ci|ci) = αi(ci|di) = ǫ, αi(di|ci) =
αi(di|di) = 1− ǫ and all the other αj(dj |cj) as in the trivial deviation vector. We now
prove (ii): Assume that ci is not eliminated in full dual reductions and let α be a full
dual vector. For 0 < λ ≤ 1, define the dual vector αλ by: αλi (ci|ci) = λαi(ci|ci),
αλi (di|ci) = αi(di|ci) + (1 − λ)αi(ci|ci) and all other αλj (dj |cj) as in α. Since α
is full and α and αλ are positive in the same components, αλ is full too. Therefore,
there exists an αλi -invariant strategy σλi such that σλi (ci) > 0. We claim that if λ′ 6=
λ, σλi is not αλ
′
i -invariant (proof below). This implies that if λ′ 6= λ, αλ and αλ
′
induce different full dual reductions. Therefore there exists an infinity of different
full dual reductions. Finally, to prove the claim, note that if σλi is αλ
′
i -invariant, then∑
ei∈Ci−ci
αλ
′
i (ci|ei)σ
λ
i (ei) = [1− α
λ′
i (ci|ci)]σ
λ
i (ci). But if λ′ 6= λ:∑
ei∈Ci−ci
αλ
′
i (ci|ei)σ
λ
i (ei) =
∑
ei∈Ci−ci
αλi (ci|ei)σ
λ
i (ei)
= [1− αλi (ci|ci)]σ
λ
i (ci) 6= [1− α
λ′
i (ci|ci)]σ
λ
i (ci)
A similar difficulty may arise if a player is indifferent between a pure and a mixed
strategy (example 5.20) or if a player becomes indifferent between some of his strate-
gies, after strategies of some other player have been eliminated (example 5.14). These
are non-generic phenomena. We prove in this section that, for any positive integer m,
two-player games generically have a unique iterative full dual reduction of depth m.
We first show that there are severe restrictions on the ways strategies may be grouped
together in dual reductions:
Notation: for all i in N , let Bi ⊆ Ci and let B = ×i∈NBi. We denote by ΓB =
(N, (Bi)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N ) the game obtained from Γ by reducing the pure strategy set of
player i to Bi, for all i in N .
Proposition 6.2 Let α be a dual vector. For each i in N , let Bi ⊆ Ci denote a minimal
αi-absorbing set and B = ×i∈NBi. Let σBi denote the unique αi-invariant strategy
of player i with support in Bi and σB = (σBi)i∈N . We have: σB is a completely mixed
Nash equilibrium of ΓB .
Proof. First, the support of σBi is exactly Bi so σB is completely mixed. Second, let
σB−i = ×j∈N−iσBj . Against σB−i , player i is indifferent between the strategies of
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the minimal absorbing set Bi (proposition 4.5). Therefore, if player i is restricted to
the strategies of Bi, σBi is a best response to σB−i
Define α and σBi as in the above proposition 6.2 and assume α full. If ΓB has a unique
completely mixed Nash equilibrium, then for any full dual vector β, the βi-invariant
strategy with support inBi must be σBi . So proposition 6.2 has the following corollary:
Corollary 6.3 If for every product B = ×i∈NBi of subsets Bi of Ci, ΓB has at most
one completely mixed Nash equilibrium, then there exists a unique full dual reduction.
In the remaining of this section, Γ is a two-player (bimatrix) game. To show that,
generically, two-player games have a unique sequence of iterative full dual reductions,
we need to introduce some suitable notions of genericity:
Definition 6.4 Γ is generic if for all Nash equilibria σ the supports of σ1 and σ2 have
same cardinal14. Γ is locally generic if it is generic and if any game obtained from Γ
by deleting some pure strategies is generic.
Definition 6.5 Γ is 2-generic if for any subset B1 of C1 and for any disjoint subsets B2
andB′2 ofC2: if σ and σ′ are respectively completely mixed Nash equilibria of ΓB1×B2
and ΓB1×B′2 then σ1 6= σ
′
1. That is, the same mixed strategy cannot be a completely
mixed Nash equilibrium strategy of player 1 both on B1 × B2 and on B1 × B′2. The
notion of 1-genericity is defined similarly. A bimatrix game is ∗-generic if it is both
1-generic and 2-generic.
A bimatrix game in which players 1 and 2 have respectively p and q pure strategies is
given by two p × q payoff matrices, thus it may be viewed as a point in Rpq × Rpq .
It may be shown that the set of p × q bimatrix games which are both locally generic
and ∗-generic contains an open, dense subset of Rpq ×Rpq . The two next propositions
follow from proposition 6.2:
Proposition 6.6 A locally generic bimatrix game has a unique full dual reduction.
Proof. Locally generic bimatrix games check the conditions of corollary 6.3
Proposition 6.7 If Γ is both locally generic and ∗-generic, there are only three possi-
bilities:
1 Γ is elementary
2 In all dual reductions of Γ, some strategies are eliminated, but no strategies are
grouped together.
3 In any full dual reduction of Γ the reduced strategy space C/α is a singleton.
Proof. Assume that Γ is not elementary and let α be a nontrivial dual vector. Assume
that some strategies of player 1 (for instance) are grouped together. That is, there exists
a minimal α1-absorbing set B1 with at least two elements. Let B2 and B′2 be minimal
α2-absorbing sets. Let σB1 denote the α1-invariant strategy with support in B1. Define
14Any game which is nondegenerate in the sense of [15, def. 2.6 and thm 2.10] is generic in this sense.
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σB2 and σB′2 similarly. By proposition 6.2, σB1 is a Nash equilibrium strategy both of
ΓB1×B2 and of ΓB1×B′2 . Since Γ is ∗-generic, this implies B2 = B
′
2. Therefore, there
is a unique minimal α2-absorbing set, B2. That is, C2/α2 is a singleton. Moreover,
since Γ is locally generic, B1 and B2 have same cardinal. Thus B2 has at least two
elements. Therefore, by the above reasoning, the strategy set of player 1 in Γ/α is also
a singleton and we are done.
As an immediate corollary of proposition 6.7 and definitions 6.4 and 6.5 we get:
Corollary 6.8 If Γ is both locally generic and ∗-generic then any dual reduction of Γ
is both locally generic and ∗-generic.
As an immediate corollary of proposition 6.6 and corollary 6.8 we get:
Theorem 6.9 If Γ is both locally generic and ∗-generic, then for any positive integer
m, Γ has a unique iterative full dual reduction of depth m.
7 Dual reduction and elimination of unacceptable pure
strategies
Dual reduction and elimination of unacceptable pure strategies [7] both include elim-
ination of dominated strategies. Furthermore, there are similarities in the ways these
concepts are defined.15 Comparing dual reduction and elimination of unacceptable
pure strategies is thus quite natural. In this section we show by means of example that
none of these refinement concepts is more stringent than the other.
We first introduce some notations and definitions (most of the phrasing is taken
from [7] and [2]; see also [8]): let S ⊆ N . If S is nonempty we let
CS = ×i∈SCi
(so CN = C), and we let C∅ = {∅}. If c is in C and dS in CS then (c−S , dS) denotes
the strategy profile in which player i plays di if i ∈ S and ci if i /∈ S.
Definition 7.1 An ǫ-correlated strategy η is a lottery choosing a vector of ”recom-
mended” pure strategies (i.e. a point in C), a coalition S of trembling players, and
a vector of trembles (i.e. a point in CS) for those players (hence, formally, it is a
probability distribution over C × (∪S⊆CS)) such that:
(a) Given any vector of recommendations, the conditional probability of every
coalition of trembling players and every vector of trembles for these players is strictly
positive.
(b) Given any vector of recommendations c, any subset S of players not including
player i and any vector of trembles dS for those players : given that the coalition of
trembling players is either S or S ∪ {i} and that the players of S tremble to dS , the
conditional probability of i also trembling is at most ǫ.
15In particular, the aggregate incentive value of c for the set of players N : VN (c, α), defined in [7, p.141,
(3.3)], is exactly the payoff g(c, α) defined in section 3.
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Let η be an ǫ-correlated strategy. Consider the extended game in which each player
is first informed of his recommended action; next the non-trembling players are asked
to move - while the trembling players are forced to move using the selected trembles.
The ǫ-correlated strategy η is an ǫ-correlated equilibrium if, in this extended game, the
obedient strategies form a Nash equilibrium.
A correlated strategy µ ∈ ∆(C) is an acceptable correlated equilibrium [7] if it
is a limit (ǫ → 0) of distributions (i.e. marginal distributions on C) of ǫ-correlated
equilibria. That is, if for all positive ǫ there exists some ǫ-correlated equilibrium ηǫ
such that for all c in C: limǫ→0 ηǫ(c, ∅) = µ(c), where ηǫ(c, ∅) is the probability that
c is recommended and that no player trembles. Acceptable correlated equilibria are
correlated equilibrium distributions [7, theorem 1].
A pure strategy ci is acceptable [7] if, for every ǫ > 0, there exists some ǫ-
correlated equilibrium η such that ∑
c−i∈C−i
η(c, ∅) > 0
(that is, in Myerson terms’s, ”if ci can be rationally used when the probabilities of
trembling are infinitesimal” [9]).
The acceptable residue R(Γ) of a game Γ is the game obtained from Γ by eliminat-
ing all the unacceptable pure strategies. Myerson shows [7, theorems 2 and 4] that the
acceptable correlated equilibria are exactly the correlated equilibrium distributions of
R(Γ) (technically, the c.e.d. of Γ in which only acceptable pure strategies are played
and whose marginal distribution on the product of the sets of acceptable pure strategies
are c.e.d. of R(Γ)). This is analogous to theorem 4.4 and proposition 5.10.
As dual reduction, elimination of unacceptable pure strategies may be iterated. A
pure strategy is predominant if it remains after iterative elimination of unacceptable
pure strategies, and correlated equilibrium distributions in which only predominant
strategies are played are called predominant.
We now compare dual reduction and elimination of unacceptable pure strategies.
We first need a lemma:
Lemma 7.2 If there exists a correlated equilibrium distribution with full support then
all pure strategies are acceptable and predominant.
Lemma 7.2 is proved in appendix B. It implies that the class of games in which all pure
strategies are acceptable is strictly larger than the class of elementary games. This is not
only due to the fact that in a game in which all strategy profiles are played in correlated
equilibria, such as Matching-Pennies, dual reduction can still group strategies together.
Indeed, consider the following game of coordination where, moreover, player 2 has an
outside option:
Example 7.3
x2 y2 z2
y1 0, 0 1, 1 −1,−1
z1 0, 0 −1,−1 1, 1
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In this game, playing each strategy with equal probability is a completely mixed Nash
equilibrium. Thus, by lemma 7.2, all strategies are acceptable and predominant. How-
ever, x2 is eliminated in any nontrivial dual reduction. (To prove this, note that x2 is
equivalent to 12y2 +
1
2z2; this implies that y2 and z2 jeopardize x2. Furthermore yi
and zi must be invariant under any dual vector because they have positive probability
in some strict correlated equilibrium distribution. So there is a unique dual reduction,
which consists in eliminating x2.)
This example shows that dual reduction may eliminate acceptable and even pre-
dominant pure strategies. It also shows that dual reduction can eliminate completely
mixed, hence perfect Nash equilibria. Since any perfect Nash equilibrium is a perfect
direct correlated equilibrium [2], it shows that dual reduction may eliminate perfect
direct correlated equilibrium distributions.
The next example shows that there may be unacceptable pure strategies that no
dual reduction eliminates: let Γ denote the following three-player game, where player
1 chooses the matrix (x1 or y1), player 2 the row, and player 3 the column:
Example 7.4 (taken from [7])
x1
x3 y3 z3
x2 2, 1, 1 0, 2, 0 0, 2, 0
y2 0, 0, 2 0, 3, 0 0, 0, 3
z2 0, 0, 2 0, 0, 3 0, 3, 0
y1
x3 y3 z3
x2 1, 3, 3 1, 3, 3 1, 3, 3
y2 1, 3, 3 1, 3, 3 1, 3, 3
z2 1, 3, 3 1, 3, 3 1, 3, 3
Myerson [7] shows that the only acceptable strategies for player i is xi, for all i in
{1, 2, 3}. However, y1 cannot be eliminated by one-shot dual reduction. Indeed, let
c = (y1, y2, y3) andα be a dual vector; by definition 4.1,
∑
i∈N [Ui(αi∗c)−Ui(c)] ≥ 0;
since c is a Nash equilibrium and all unilateral deviations from c by player 1 are strictly
detrimental for him, this implies that y1 is invariant under α.
Note that y1 may be eliminated by iterative dual reduction. Actually, to prove
that y2, z2, y3, z3 and y1 are unacceptable, Myerson uses the codomination system16
(α1, α2) where α1 and α2 are the deviation vectors such that:
α1i (xi|yi) = α
1
i (xi|zi) = 1 ∀i ∈ {2, 3}, α
2
1(x1|y1) = 1,
and all other αki (di|ci) are as in the corresponding trivial deviation vectors. It is easy
to check that α1 is a dual vector of Γ and α2 a dual vector of Γ/α1. The only strategy
profile remaining in Γ/α1/α2 is the strict Nash equilibrium (x1, x2, x3), thus y1 has
been eliminated. Whether some unacceptable (or non predominant) pure strategies
cannot be eliminated by any iterative dual reduction is still an open problem.
8 Some applications of dual reduction
As a refinement concept or as a way to simplify a game, dual reduction has some
nice properties: it does not depend on the (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility func-
tions chosen to represent the preferences of the players; strategies which are never
16For a definition of codomination systems, see [7] or [8].
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played in correlated equilibria are eliminated; zero-sum games are reduced to their
value; symmetric games may be reduced symmetrically; strict correlated equilibria are
never eliminated, and others. But it also suffers from some drawbacks: first, it is not
clearly motivated; second, a game may have several full dual reductions.17 It is thus
not clear to us that dual reduction deserves to be studied as a refinement concept or as
”a powerful generalization of elimination of weakly dominated strategies” [9, p.202].
But we feel that the underlying mathematical machinery is powerful indeed and may
prove useful to investigate the geometry of correlated equilibria. For instance, while
working on other topics, dual reduction helped us in proving the following results:
Proposition 8.1 Assume that no pure strategy is dominated in the sense that:
∀i ∈ I,∀ci ∈ Ci,∀σi ∈ ∆(Ci), σi 6= ci ⇒ ∃c−i ∈ C−i, Ui(c) > Ui(c−i, σi) (10)
Then C does not have dimension N − 2.
Proof. If the game is elementary, then C has dimension N − 1. Otherwise, there exists
i in I , ci in Ci and di in Ci such that di jeopardizes ci. Therefore there exists a dual
vectorα such that ci /∈ Ci/αi. But ci is undominated in the sense of (10). Therefore, by
proposition 5.11, there exists j in N − i and cj in Cj such that cj /∈ Cj/αj . Therefore
cj is jeopardized by some strategy dj ∈ Cj − cj . This implies that for all c.e.d. µ,∑
c−j∈C−j
µ(c)[Uj(c)− Uj(c−j , dj)] = 0 (11)
Similarly, di jeopardizes ci, so for all µ in C,∑
c−i∈C−i
µ(c)[Ui(c)− Ui(c−i, di)] = 0 (12)
Condition (10) implies that neither (11) nor (12) is checked by all points in RS and that
(11) and (12) are not equivalent. As an intersection of two non identical hyperplanes,
the set of points of RS checking (11) and (12) is a vector space of dimension N−2. Its
intersection with the simplex has at most dimension N − 3 and includes C. Therefore
C has at most dimension N − 3.
To state the next result, we first need a definition: a game is prebinding [14] if for
all player i in I and all pure strategies ci in Ci : if ci is played in some correlated
equilibrium (that is, if there exists a c.e.d. µ such that µ(ci × C−i) > 0) then ci
jeopardizes all pure strategies of player i. Finally, since conditions (1), (2) and (3) are
all linear the set of correlated equilibrium distributions is a polytope; we call it below
the correlated equilibrium polytope.
Starting from [10] and using the dual reduction technique, I show in [14] that:
Proposition 8.2 A game is prebinding if and only if its correlated equilibrium polytope
is a singleton or contains a Nash equilibrium distribution in its relative interior.
17The fact that locally generic two-player games have a unique full dual reduction hardly helps as games
for which refinements are needed are typically nongeneric.
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A The linear programming proofs of existence of cor-
related equilibria
In this appendix, we review and connect the proofs of existence of correlated equilibria
given in [3], [11] and [9].
A.1 Hart & Schmeidler’s proof
Consider the following two-player, zero-sum, auxiliary game GHS : the maximizer
chooses a strategy profile c = (c1, .., cn) in C; the minimizer chooses a player i in N
and a couple of strategy (c′i, di) in Ci×Ci. The payoff is Ui(c)−Ui(c−i, di) if c′i = ci
and 0 otherwise. In mixed strategies the maximizer chooses a correlated strategy µ in
∆(C) and the minimizer a probability distribution ν on triples (i, ci, di) ∈ N×Ci×Ci;
the expected payoff is then:
ghs(µ, ν) =
∑
c∈C
µ(c)
∑
i∈N
∑
di∈Ci
ν(i, ci, di)[Ui(c)− Ui(c−i, di)] (13)
As in the auxiliary game G of section 3, µ guarantees 0 if and only if µ is a correlated
equilibrium distribution of the original game. Thus, to prove the existence of correlated
equilibrium distributions, it is enough to show that the value of GHS is nonnegative.
To do so, Hart and Schmeidler could have used the existence of invariant distributions
for finite Markov chains:18
Lemma A.1 Let M be a m × m stochastic matrix (i.e. nonnegative with columns
summing to unity); there exists a probability vector x = (xj)j=1,...,m such that Mx =
x.
Instead, they used the following lemma:
Lemma A.2 (Hart&Schmeidler) Let (ajk)1≤j,k≤m be nonnegative numbers. There
exists a probability vector x = (xj)j=1,...,m such that, for any vector u = (uj)j=1,...,m
,
m∑
j=1
xj
m∑
k=1
ajk(uj − uk) = 0 (14)
Proposition A.3 Lemmas A.1 and A.2 are equivalent
Proof. (i) in (14 we may assume∑j ajk = 1 without loss of generality (indeed, one
may increase arbitrarily the coefficients akk to ensure that each row sums to some pos-
itive constant and then divide all coefficients by this constant to normalize); (ii) by
18Let λ be a positive constant. If λ is small enough, any strategy of the minimizer in G can be emulated
in GHS , up to the scaling factor λ, by letting: ν(i, ci, di) = λαi(di|ci)/n if di 6= ci, and giving any
value (up to normalization of ν) to ν(i, ci, ci). Conversely, any strategy ν of the minimizer in GHS can be
emulated in G by letting αi(di|ci) = ν(i, ci, di) if ci 6= di and αi(di|ci) = 1−
∑
di 6=ci
ν(i, ci, di); it
follows that the value of G is nonnegative if and only if the value of GHS is nonnegative. Thus the proof of
section 3 must go through.
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linearity (14 holds for all vector u if and only if it holds for all basis vectors (i.e. with
one component equal to 1 and all the others zero); (iii) (14 holds for all basis vectors
iff
∑
j xjaji = xi (=
∑
j ajixi) for all i; that is, iff ATx = x where AT denote the
m × m square matrix whose (i, j) entry is aji. (iv) Thus lemma A.2 boils down to
lemma A.1 applied to M = AT . Reciprocally, lemma A.1 is a special case of lemma
A.2
Incidentally, Hart&Schmeidler prove their lemma using the Minimax theorem; so propo-
sition A.3 yields a game-theoretic proof of the existence of invariant distributions for
finite Markov chains.19
A.2 Other proofs
Nau and McCardle’s proof is very similar. They also introduce (implicitly) the payoff
matrix of GHS . A strategy profile c is defined to be jointly coherent if g(c, α) = 0
for all dual vectors α. Nau and McCardle show through lemma A.1, and essentially
as in section 3, that there exists a jointly coherent strategy profile. Finally, they prove
through a variant of Farkas lemma that a strategy profile is jointly coherent if and
only if it has positive probability in some correlated equilibrium distribution.20 Thus
correlated equilibrium distributions exists.
Myerson’s proofs is essentially the proof of section 3. The only difference is that
instead of introducing an auxiliary zero-sum game, Myerson introduces an auxiliary
linear program and then uses linear duality. Deviation vectors appear as vectors of dual
variables, hence the terms dual vector and dual reduction. Myerson’s linear program
corresponds to the maximisation’s program of the maximizer in the auxiliary game of
section 3.
B Proofs
In this appendix, we prove lemma 5.9, proposition 5.21 and lemma 7.2.
Proof of lemma 5.9: let λ ∈ ∆(C). We only need to show that if λ is α-invariant
then it is Γ-equivalent to a correlated strategy of Γ/α. Indeed, the converse is clear by
linearity of λ→ αi∗λ. Furthermore, lettingC/αi = Ci/αi×C−i, it is enough to show
that if λ is αi-invariant then there exists λ in ∆(C/αi) such that (i) λ is Γ-equivalent to
λ and (ii) if λ is αj-invariant, then so is λ. Indeed, as the number of players is finite, a
simple induction then proves the property. So let us assume that λ is αi-invariant. That
is,
αi ∗λ(c−i, ci) =
∑
di∈Ci
αi(ci|di)λ(c−i, di) = λ(c−i, ci) ∀ci ∈ Ci,∀c−i ∈ C−i (15)
19I owe this remark to B. von Stengel, who first showed me a proof of lemma A.1 based on linear duality.
Such a proof can also be found in [6, ex. 9, p. 41]
20In the framework of section 3, this corresponds to the following result: in a finite, two-player zero-sum
game, a pure strategy is a best-response to all optimal strategies of the other player if and only if it has
positive probability in some optimal strategy. This follows from the strong complementarity property of
linear programs
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(The first equality merely repeats the definition of αi∗λ.) Equation (15) means that, for
all c−i inC−i, the vector [λ(c−i, ci)]ci∈Ci is αi-invariant. Therefore: (a) λ(ci×C−i) =
0 if ci is αi-transient and (b) for any minimal αi-absorbing set Bi, [λ(c−i, ci)]ci∈Bi is
proportional to [σBi(ci)]ci∈Bi , where σBi is the unique αi-invariant strategy with sup-
port inBi. More precisely, define λ ∈ ∆(C/αi) by: λ(c−i, σBi) =
∑
ci∈Bi
λ(c−i, ci),
we have:
λ(c−i, ci) = λ(c−i, σBi)× σBi(ci) ∀ci ∈ Bi,∀c−i ∈ C−i
The above equality means that λ is Γ-equivalent to λ. Finally it is straightforward to
check that if λ is αj-invariant, then so is λ. This completes the proof.
Definition of symmetric games and proof of proposition 5.21: let Γ be a game in
which all players have the same number m of pure strategies. Let ci,k denote the kth
strategy of player i. Thus Ci = {ci,1, ..., ci,m}. For all i in N , let ki be an integer in
{1,...,m}. Let (ci,ki)i∈N denote the profile of strategy in which, for all i, player i plays
his kthi strategy. Γ is a symmetric game if for all permutations p of the set of players,
Ui((cj,kp(j))j∈N ) = Up(i)((cj,kj )j∈N )
This means that if, for all i, player i plays as player p(i) used to play, then the payoff of
player i in the new configuration is the payoff of player p(i) in the old configuration.
We now prove the proposition:
Step 1: let us say that a deviation vector α of a symmetric game is symmetric if
αi(ci,k′ |ci,k) = αj(cj,k′ |cj,k) for all i, j in N and all k, k′ in {1, 2,.., m}. It is clear
that if Γ is a symmetric game and α a symmetric dual vector, then Γ/α is a symmetric
game. So it is enough to show that there exists a symmetric full dual vector.
Step 2: let α denote a deviation vector. For all permutations p of the set of players,
let αp denote the deviation vector such that:
αpp(i)(cp(i),k′ |cp(i),k) = αi(ci,k′ |ci,k) ∀i ∈ N
Let α¯ denote the symmetrized deviation vector given by:
α¯ =
∑
p α
p
n!
where n is the number of players and the summation is taken over all permutations p
of the set of players.
It is easy to check that α¯ is symmetric and that if α is a dual vector then so are all the
αp, hence so is α¯. Furthermore if αi(di|ci) is positive then so is α¯i(di|ci) (since in the
summation defining α¯, αp = α when p is the identity permutation). Thus if α is a full
dual vector then α¯ is a symmetric full dual vector.
Proof of lemma 7.2 : Assume that there exists a c.e.d. µ with full support. By [7,
theorem 2], if µ is acceptable, then any pure strategy is acceptable, hence any pure
strategy is predominant. Thus, it is enough to show that µ is acceptable. The trick
is that, because µ has full support, it is possible to find trembles that will mimick µ,
so that whoever the players trembling, a nontrembling player always faces the same
conditional probabilities given his signal than in µ.
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More precisely, assume that there exists some ǫ-correlated strategy η such that:
∀S ⊆ C,∀dS ∈ CS , ∀c ∈ C, η(c, dS) = K(S, ǫ)µ(c−S , dS) (16)
where K is a positive constant that depends only on S and on ǫ (but not on c−S). That
is, given any coalition S of trembling players, any vector dS of trembles assigned to
S, and any strategy profile c, the probability in η that (c−S , dS) will be played as a
result of the players being recommended c, the players of C−S not trembling, and the
players of S trembling to dS , is proportional to the probability of (c−S , dS) in µ. The
total probability in η that S and only S trembles and that (c−S , dS) is played is then:∑
eS∈CS
η((c−S , eS), dS) = K
′(S, ǫ)µ(c−S , dS)
where K ′ is a positive constant which depends only on S and on ǫ. It follows that, if
i /∈ S and ci ∈ Ci, the expected strategy of the other players in η, given ci and given
that S and only S trembles, is the same that the expected strategy of the other players
in µ given ci. A fortiori, the expected strategy in η given ci and given that player i does
not tremble is the same that the expected strategy in µ given ci, to which ci is a best
response. Thus, η is an ǫ-equilibrium.
It remains to show that it is possible to find a sequence of ǫ-correlated strategy
checking (16) and such that η(c, ∅) tends to µ(c) as ǫ goes to zero. Such a sequence
may be build by taking for all c in C and for some suitable positive normalization
constant A:
η(c, ∅) = A× µ(c)
and, inductively, if the cardinal of S ⊆ C is m+ 1:
η(c, eS) =
ǫ
1− ǫ
Am × µ(c−S , eS)
with
Am = min
d∈C
min
T∈S:Card T=m
min
eT∈CT
η(d, eT )
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